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Representing Strategies
Hein Duijf Jan Broersen∗
Quite some work in the ATL-tradition uses the differences between various types of strategies (po-
sitional, uniform, perfect recall) to give alternative semantics to the same logical language. This
paper contributes to another perspective on strategy types, one where we characterise the differences
between them on the syntactic (object language) level. This is important for a more traditional knowl-
edge representation view on strategic content. Leaving differences between strategy types implicit in
the semantics is a sensible idea if the goal is to use the strategic formalism for model checking. But,
for traditional knowledge representation in terms of object language level formulas, we need to extent
the language. This paper introduces a strategic STIT syntax with explicit operators for knowledge
that allows us to charaterise strategy types. This more expressive strategic language is interpreted
on standard ATL-type concurrent epistemic game structures. We introduce rule-based strategies in
our language and fruitfully apply them to the representation and characterisation of positional and
uniform strategies. Our representations highlight crucial conditions to be met for strategy types.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our work by showing that it leads to a critical reexamination of
coalitional uniform strategies.
1 Introduction
To make way for strategic reasoning on the syntactic level we need to know how to represent the various
types of strategies that have been proposed in the literature. In this paper, our aim in particular will be
to provide syntactic counterparts for the various strategy types proposed in the ATL-tradition, such as
positional strategies [2] and uniform strategies [10]. Our proposed language, an extension of strategic
STIT including temporal and epistemic modalities and action types, is sufficiently expressive for repre-
senting positional and uniform strategies.1 Whereas the introduction of positional and uniform strategies
are intuitively appealing, our characterizations elucidate the underlying conditions to be met for these
semantically defined strategy types. Although emulating ability-modalities akin to the ATL-tradition is
not the main objective here, some hints are provided that guide such a future endeavour.
Our representation of uniform positional strategies enhances the understanding of a coalition’s uni-
form strategy. Our result naturally invites different ways to distribute relevant strategic knowledge. This
observation complements [1] where it is argued that a coalition’s uniform strategy is imprecise only in
the “mode” of the coalition’s knowledge, referring either to common, distributive or mutual knowledge.
To further explain our view and approach, we will subsequently answer the following three questions:
1. what is a strategy?
2. how to represent the performance of a strategy?
3. how to characterize a rule-based strategy?
∗Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the ERC-2013-CoG project REINS, nr. 616512
1Recently, a syntactic characterization of uniform strategies in Epistemic Strategy Logic was presented [11]. Our represen-
tation differs in that we use rule-based strategies.
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what is a strategy?
It is remarkable how strong the notion of a strategy varies throughout the literature on strategic reason-
ing. In ATL frameworks2 a strategy is a mapping that assigns an action type to every finite history of
system states; in STIT frameworks3, since acting means restricting the possible futures, a strategy is
identified with the futures it allows; finally Dynamic Logics4 take strategies to be temporally extended
act structures of sequences of (atomic) actions. This paper starts with the ATL conception of strategy
types and ultimately provides representations thereof.
how to represent the performance of a strategy?
To express that a strategy is actually performed, we use insights from STIT frameworks. Other frame-
works express strategy performance only implicitly, safely tucked away under path quantifiers (ATL) or
in quantifiers in the central modalities (Dynamic logic). This follows from the observation that he main
operators 〈〈C〉〉ϕ and [α]ϕ in these systems are interpreted as ‘coalition C is able to ensure ϕ’ and ‘after
executing action α , ϕ holds’. This reveals that ATL enables one to reason about strategic ability and
Dynamic Logics support reasoning about the results of actions, but not reasoning about the performance
of actions or strategies here and now.
how to characterize a rule-based strategy?
Strategies are typically communicated in the form of condition-action rules. Therefore it makes sense to
also logically represent them in that form using a suitable language. Recently, ATL has been extended to
enable reasoning about rule-based strategies in [17]. One of the main themes there is the representation
of (semantic) strategies by formulas of their proposed language, which includes rule-based strategies.
A different study in [16] evaluates formulas at game-strategy pairs thereby combining aspects of Game
Logic5 and strategic reasoning. They propose a multi-sorted language to express the structure of the
strategy. The logic includes two types of conditional strategies [ψ 7→ a]i and pi 7→σ , which are interpreted
as ‘player i chooses move a whenever ψ holds’ and ‘player i sticks to the specification given by σ if on
the history of play, all moves made by i¯ conform to pi’, respectively. Theψ in the first formula is restricted
to boolean combinations of propositional letters, and the second formula represents that the other players
have acted in accordance with pi . We, however, do not want to commit ourselves to these restrictions
in the language or regarding the conditions; Most importantly, to represent uniform strategies epistemic
conditions have to be allowed.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the well-known Concurrent Epistemic Game Models
(see [2] and [8]) are introduced to provide the basis for our semantics. In contrast to the usual ATL∗-
divide between path and state formulae, a key idea from G.STRAT6 to evaluate formulas against tuples
consisting of the state, path and the current strategy profile is implemented in Section 3. In parallel, a
logical language is introduced including action types and temporal, epistemic and agency operators. As is
common in STIT frameworks, the structure of a strategy can be described by specifying the (temporal)
properties it ensures. This allows us to view a rule-based strategy as a set of condition-effect rules in
Section 4, which are then used in Section 5 to investigate how this logical language can be fruitfully
applied to represent strategy types. Certain types of rule-based strategies are used to represent positional
and uniform strategies, thereby uncovering crucial conditions for these semantic strategy types. Some
novel implications are drawn on coalition’s uniform strategies by appealing, not to different “modes”
of coalitional knowledge but, to ways of distributing the relevant strategic knowledge. We conclude in
2See the seminal work [2] and extensions such as CATL [7], and Strategy Logic [6] and [12].
3See the seminal work [3], [9] and the recent extension to strategic action [5].
4See [4].
5See the original work [14] and the overview [15].
6G.STRAT is first introduced in [5]. It is an extension of basic STIT frameworks to a strategic and multi-agent setting.
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Section 6, proof sketches are to be found in the appendix.
2 Concurrent Game Models
In this section we introduce Concurrent Game Models (see [2]) and Concurrent Epistemic Game Models
(see [8]). Our treatment will be roughly in line with [1] although our notation on histories will differ to
neatly support the syntactic approach in the next section.
Definition 1 (Concurrent game structure and model). A concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple
S = (Ag, St, Act, act, out) which consists of:
1. a finite, non-empty set of agents Ag = {1, . . . , K}; the subsets of Ag are called coalitions;
2. a non-empty set of states St;
3. a non-empty set of action types Act;
4. an action manager function act : Ag× St→P(Act) assigning to every player i and state q a
non-empty set of actions available for execution by i at q.
An action profile is a tuple of actions α = 〈α1, . . . ,αK〉 ∈ ActK . The action profile is executable
at the state q if αi ∈ act(i,q) for every i ∈ Ag. We denote by act(q) the subset of ∏i∈Ag act(i,q)
consisting of all action profiles executable at the state q.
5. (a) a transition function out that assigns an outcome state out(q,α) to every state q and every
action profile α ∈ act(q).7
(b) for every two states q,q′ there is at most one α ∈ act(q) such that out(q,α) = q′, i.e. if a
state transition is labelled, then it has a unique label.
A concurrent game model (CGM) is a CGS endowed with a labeling L : St→P(Prop) of the states
with sets of atomic propositions from a fixed set Prop. As usual, the labeling describes which atomic
propositions are true at a given state.
We fix a concurrent game structure S = (Ag, St, Act, act, out). An action profile is used to deter-
mine a successor of a state using the transition function out. The set of the available action profiles is
denoted by act(q), consequently the set of possible successors of q is the set of states out(q,α) where
α ranges over act(q). An infinite sequence λ = q0q1q2 · · · of states from St is called a play if qk+1 is a
successor of qk for all positions k ≥ 0. λ [k] denotes the k-th component qk in λ , and λ [0,k] denotes the
initial sequence, or history, q0 · · ·qk of λ .
A perfect recall strategy for an agent i is a function si that maps every history λ [0,k] to an action type
si(λ [0,k]) ∈ act(λ [k]). A positional (aka memoryless) strategy for an agent i is a function si that maps
every state q to an action type. A perfect recall strategy for a coalition C ⊆ Ags, also called a coalitional
strategy for C, is a function sC mapping each agent i ∈ C to a perfect recall strategy sC(i). Positional
strategies for coalitions are defined analogously. A strategy profile s is a coalitional strategy for Ag. A
coalitional strategy sC extends s′C′ , notation sC w s′C′ , if and only if C ⊇ C′ and s′C′(i) = sC(i) for every
i ∈C. Given a strategy profile, we often write sC for the coalitional strategy for C satisfying sC v s.
7In [1, p. 553 – our boldfacing, emphasis in original] they introduce out as “a transition function out that assigns a unique
outcome state out(q,α) to every state q and every action profile α which is executable at q”. We are puzzled about what this
required uniqueness adds to the fact that out is a function. Although they do not explicitly mention what is meant, we think
this uniqueness is represented in (b). The examples that they consider are in line with (b). This addition is crucial for our main
Proposition 1(3) as it implies that two strategies are play-equivalent if and only if they are identical.
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The set out_plays(λ [0,k],sC) of outcome plays of a strategy sC for C at a history λ [0,k] is the set
of all plays λ ′ = q0q1 · · · such that λ ′[0,k] = λ [0,k] and, for every l ≥ k, there is an action profile
α = 〈α1, . . . ,αK〉 satisfying αi = sC(i)(λ ′[l]) for all i ∈C and ql+1 = out(ql,α).
Our formal results rely on the notion of play-equivalence:
Definition 2 (Play-equivalence). Let λ be a play, let k be a position, let C a coalition, and let sC, s′C
perfect recall strategies. We say that sC and s′C are play-equivalent at λ [0,k] if and only if
out_plays(λ [0,k],sC) = out_plays(λ [0,k],s′C).
It is standard to model the agent’s incomplete information by extending concurrent game models:
Definition 3 (Concurrent Epistemic Game Model). A concurrent epistemic game model (CEGM) is a
tupleM = (Ag, St, {∼i| i ∈ Ag}, Act, act, out, L) which consists of a CGM (Ag, St, Act, act, out, L)
and indistinguishability relations ∼i⊆ St×St, one for each agent. Furthermore, it is assumed that (1)
∼i is an equivalence relation, and (2) q∼i q′ implies that act(q, i) = act(q′, i).
These indinstinguishability relations are straightforwardly extended to histories by: λ [0,k]∼i λ ′[0,k′]
iff k = k′ and for every l ≤ k we have λ [l]∼i λ ′[l]. Then we introduce a third strategy type:
a uniform strategy for an agent i is a perfect recall strategy si satisfying: for all histories λ [0,k],
λ ′[0,k′] ∈ St+, if λ [0,k]∼i λ ′[0,k′] then si(λ [0,k]) = si(λ ′[0,k′]).
A uniform coalitional strategy for coalition C is a function sC mapping each agent i ∈C to a uniform
strategy sC(i).
In the remainder, we mean “perfect recall strategies” when writing “strategies”, unless otherwise
specified.
3 Strategic language
In the previous section we outlined the models that provide the basis for the semantics of our logical
enterprise. In the current section we introduce our logical framework, which is inspired by [5].8 First,
we introduce the syntax of the logical language. Second, we present the truth conditions of the logical
formalism. It is crucial that we evaluate formulas with respect to tuples 〈k,λ ,s〉 which include the
current strategic course of action s (inspiration from [5]). Finally, some crucial observations on the
resulting logical formalism are presented by reviewing the underlying models.
Definition 4 (Syntax). Fix a set of propositional letters Prop, a finite set of agents Ags, and a set of
action types Σ. The formulas of the languageL are given by:
ϕ ::= p | αC | ϕ ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ | Xϕ | Gϕ |ϕ | [C sstit]ϕ | Kiϕ ,
where p ranges over Prop, C ranges over subsets of Ags, and αC ranges over ΣC.
Given a CEGM M = (Ag, St, {∼i| i ∈ Ag}, Act, act, out, L) with Ag = Ags and Act = Σ, these
formulas will be evaluated at tuples 〈k,λ ,s〉 consisting of a strategy profile s, a play λ such that λ ∈
out_plays(λ [0],s), and a position k. This means that the truth of formulas is evaluated with respect to
a current state λ [k], a current history λ [0,k], a current future λ [k,∞), and a current strategy profile s.
Obviously, by incorporating the current strategy profile into the worlds of evaluation we get a semantic
explication of the performance of a strategy.
8Whereas [5] uses models based on the STIT-tradition, here Concurrent Game Models are used for interpreting the lan-
guage.
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The central agency operator is the modality [C sstit]ϕ which stands for ‘the coalition C strategically
sees to it that ϕ holds’. Relative to a tuple 〈k,λ ,s〉 the modality [C sstit]ϕ is interpreted as ‘the coalition C
is in the process of executing sC thereby ensuring the (temporal) condition ϕ’. In addition, the language
includes temporal modalities Xϕ and Gϕ which are interpreted, relative to a tuple 〈k,λ ,s〉, as ‘ϕ holds
in the next moment after λ [k] on λ ’ and ‘ϕ holds on all future moments after λ [k] on λ ’, respectively.
In contrast to this longitudinal dimension of time, the language includes a temporal modality ϕ for
historical necessity. The modality ϕ is interpreted, relative to a tuple 〈k,λ ,s〉, as ‘ϕ holds on any tuple
at λ [0,k]’. This highlights that the truth of ϕ does not depend on the dynamic aspects represented by
the current future and the current strategy profile, we call such formulas moment-determinate. Finally,
we include epistemic modalities Kiϕ , one for each agent, which are interpreted as ‘agent i knows that
ϕ’. The presented syntax and semantics are formally connected by the truth conditions for the syntactic
clauses:
Definition 5 (Semantics). LetM = (Ag, St, {∼i| i ∈ Ag}, Act, act, out, L) be a CEGM with Ag = Ags
and Act= Σ. The points of evaluation for our logical formulas are tuples 〈k,λ ,s〉 consisting of a strategy
profile s, a play λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],s), and a position k. The truth conditions are given by inductive
definitions (suppressing the modelM and not listing standard propositional truth conditions):
〈k,λ ,s〉  αC ⇔ sC(λ [0,k]) = αC
〈k,λ ,s〉  Xϕ ⇔ 〈k+1,λ ,s〉  ϕ
〈k,λ ,s〉  Gϕ ⇔ for each l ≥ k : 〈l,λ ,s〉  ϕ
〈k,λ ,s〉  ϕ ⇔ for every strategy s′ and every λ ′ ∈ out_plays(λ [0,k],s′) we have 〈k,λ ′,s′〉  ϕ
〈k,λ ,s〉  [C sstit]ϕ ⇔ for every s′ w sC and every λ ′ ∈ out_plays(λ [0,k],s′) we have 〈k,λ ′,s′〉  ϕ
〈k,λ ,s〉  Kiϕ ⇔ for every λ ′,k′ such that λ ′[0,k′]∼i λ [0,k] and any s′ we have 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉  ϕ .9
With the semantics in place, we gather some crucial observations:
• Because the truth of a propositional letter only depends on the current state, it is not surprising
that the truth of any propositional formula only depends on the current state. Therefore, we will
often write λ [k]  ϕ instead of 〈k,λ ,s〉  ϕ for a propositional formula ϕ . This is connected to the
familiar divide in ATL∗ syntax between state and path formulas.
• As mentioned before, a formula ϕ is moment-determinate if ϕ↔ϕ . The truth of such formulas
only depends on the history, so we will often write λ [0,k]  ϕ instead of 〈k,λ ,s〉  ϕ for such
formulas.
• Formulas of the form Kiϕ are moment-determinate. In particular, an agent does not know what he
is doing.
• The truth of a coalitional action type only depends on the current strategy of that coalition, i.e.
〈k,λ ,s〉  αC↔ [C sstit]αC.
9Little is known about properties of this logic and such a formal inquiry would lead us to far astray from the current
enterprise. To guide some of the formal intuitions of the reader we mention some validities without proof or conceptual mo-
tivation:  and [i sstit] are S5-modalities, the [i sstit]-operator is monotone in its agency argument, i.e. for A ⊆ B we have
 [A sstit]p→ [B sstit]p, the temporal part is the standard discrete linear temporal logic containing X and G, some interac-
tion principles are  Xp → Xp,  [C sstit]Xp → X[C sstit]p,  [C sstit]p ↔ p,  [C sstit]X[C sstit]p ↔ [C sstit]Xp,
 [C sstit]G[C sstit]p↔ [C sstit]Gp, and ♦[A sstit]p∧♦[B sstit]q→ ♦[A∪B sstit](p∧ q) for disjoint coalitions A and B (inde-
pendence of agency).
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• The formula ♦αC expresses that a coalitional action type αC is executable at a state.
• Observe that only the truth conditions for the [C sstit]-operator and the action types αC involve
the current C-strategy profile. It is clear that adding (at least one of) these is necessary to express
that a certain strategy is performed. The action types are inherited from a bottom-up perspective
on strategies with the action types as atomic building blocks. In contrast, the [C sstit]-operator
incorporates a top-down view in that a strategy is described by the properties it ensures.
4 Rule-based strategies
A rule-based strategy consists of rules. Such a rule is composed of a condition and an effect, thereby
incorporating the intuition that a rule is triggered under certain conditions and has a certain effect:
Definition 6 (Rule-based strategies). A rule-based strategy RS is a finite set of condition-effect rules
{c1 7→ e1, . . . ,cN 7→ eN}, which represents that condition cn triggers effect en. We denote the set of
conditions occurring in such a rule-based strategy RS by Cond(RS), likewise the effects by Eff(RS).
Performing a rule-based strategy means that in case a rule is triggered one ensures that the corre-
sponding effect is realized:
Definition 7 (Performing rule-based strategies). Henceforth we fix a CEGM (Ag, St, {∼i| i ∈ Ag}, Act,
act, out, L) with Ag = Ags and Act = Σ. Let RS = {c1 7→ e1, . . . ,cN 7→ eN} be a rule-based strategy.
First, we say that a coalition acts according to rule-based strategy RS at 〈k,λ ,s〉, denoted by 〈k,λ ,s〉 
[C acc]RS, if and only if
〈k,λ ,s〉  [C sstit]
∧
n≤N
(cn→ [C sstit]en).
Second, we say that a coalition C performs RS at 〈k,λ ,s〉, denoted by 〈k,λ ,s〉  [C perf]RS, if and only if
〈k,λ ,s〉  [C sstit]G[C acc]RS.
The formula [C acc]S is interpreted, relative to a tuple 〈k,λ ,s〉, as ‘coalition C is in the process of
executing strategy sC thereby ensuring that the conditionals are met’. Informally, it means that coalition
C is currently performing a strategy that ensures that in case a condition holds he performs a strategy
ensuring the corresponding effect.
Although the nested [C sstit] operator may be puzzling at first sight, it makes perfect sense. To argue
in favour we break the formula down. A rule of the rule-based strategy is formalized as c→ [C sstit]e,
but one should not forget that here we intend to formulate that a coalition is acting according to such a
rule-based strategy. This is expressed by the second [C sstit] operator, which guarantees that one is acting
accordingly not only at the current play, but also at all plays in out_plays(λ [0,k],sC). To formalize that a
coalition is performing a rule-based strategy, we add the G operator to express that it is henceforth acting
according to strategy RS.
There are two ways in which a rule-based strategy can be unsatisfactory: (a) the agent might not be
able to perform a certain rule-based strategy, or (b) the action description given by a certain rule-based
strategy can be underspecified. So a rule-based strategy can be viewed as a partial perfect recall strategy
which is defined at a history if and only if it is possible to act accordingly and there is but one way to do
so.10 To investigate this more thoroughly, we continue in our logical framework.
10This resembles the informal notion of deterministic strategies in [17, p. 204]: “move recommendations are always unique”
for deterministic strategies.
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Can a given rule-based strategy RS be viewed as a partial strategy? There is a straightforward way to
attempt this whenever the conditions are moment-determinate, i.e.M  c↔c for each c∈Cond(RS).11
Using RS, we define a partial coalition strategy sRSC : St
+→ ActC by:
sRSC (λ [0,k]) = αC iff λ [0,k]  ♦[C acc]RS ∧ ([C acc]RS→ [C sstit]αC).
The first conjunct says that the coalition is able to act accordingly, whereas the second conjunct says
that performing action profile αC is the only way to do so.
Clearly, this partial coalition strategy is defined at a history λ [0,k] if the following conditions hold:
(1) there is a c ∈ Cond(RS) such that λ [0,k]  c,
(2) there is at least one αC such that λ [0,k]  ♦[C sstit]αC ∧ ([C sstit]αC→ [C acc]RS), and
(3) there is at most one αC such that λ [0,k]  ♦[C sstit]αC ∧ ([C sstit]αC→ [C acc]RS).
The failure of (1) and the failure of (3) signify that the rule-based strategy is underspecified either
because no rule has been triggered or because there are multiple ways to act accordingly. The failure
of (2), however, indicates a practical inconsistency or a conflict in the rule-based strategy RS, because it
implies that there is no way to act accordingly.
Before proceeding, we extend out_plays(−,−) to pertain also to partial strategies:
Definition 8. Let sC be a partial perfect recall strategy. We define
out_plays(λ [0,k],sC) := {λ ′ ∈ Stω | λ ′ A λ [0,k] and for every l ≥ k we have: if sC(λ ′[0, l]) is defined
then λ [l+1] ∈ out_set(λ [0, l],sC)}.
To investigate the perfect recall strategies represented by a rule-based strategy, we use the partial
strategy it defines:
Proposition 1. Let RS be a rule-based strategy with only moment-determinate conditions. Let sRSC be the
partial coalition strategy defined by RS. Then
1. for any profile 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉 such that sRSC is defined on λ ′[0,k′] we have that the following are equiv-
alent: (a) 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉  [C acc]RS and (b) sRSC (λ ′[0,k′]) = s′C(λ ′[0,k′]).
2. Let 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉 be a profile such that sRSC is defined on all histories in out_plays(λ ′[0,k′],s′C). Then
〈k′,λ ′,s′〉  [C perf]RS if and only if sRSC and s′C are play-equivalent at λ ′[0,k′].
This establishes a crucial connection between the syntactic notion of performing a rule-based strategy
and the semantic notion of a (partial) perfect recall strategy. In the following subsections we use this link
to represent positional and uniform strategies up to play-equivalence by rule-based strategies.
The notion of play-equivalence stems from the STIT views in our formalism. From a STIT perspec-
tive a strategy is identified by the futures it allows, so two play-equivalent strategies not only appear to
be same strategy, they are the same strategy.
5 Representation Results
5.1 Representing positional strategies
In this subsection, we prove that rule-based strategies can be used to represent positional strategies. For
that purpose we introduce a specific type of rule-based strategies:
11If the conditions are not moment-determinate “a choice of an agent, at a given point of a play, may depend on choices other
agents can make in the future or in counterfactual plays” (cf. the study on ”behavioral strategies” in [13, p. 149]).
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Definition 9. A proposition-action strategy RS for a coalition C is a rule-based strategy such that the
conditions c and effects e are respectively of the form:
c ::= p | c∧ c | ¬c e ::= αC,
where p ranges over Prop and αC ranges over ΣC.
Because the effects are of the form αC, there can be at most one way to act according to a proposition-
action strategy whenever one of the conditions is triggered. This motivates our definition of complete-
ness; a notion that plays a key role in our findings in the correspondence between proposition-action
strategies and positional strategies:
Definition 10 (Completeness). We say that a rule-based strategy RS = {c1 7→ e1, . . . ,cN 7→ eN} is com-
plete at λ [0,k] if and only if λ [0,k]  G∨n≤N cn, i.e. in any possible future point one of the conditions
in S is triggered.12
Proposition 2. Let s be a strategy profile, and let λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],s). Suppose there is a proposition-
action strategy RS for C that is complete at λ [0] such that 〈0,λ ,s〉 [C perf]RS. Then there is a positional
strategy sˆC that is play-equivalent to sC at λ [0].
This shows that performing a complete proposition-action strategy implies that one is performing a
strategy that is play-equivalent to a positional strategy. In a sense, this means that the strategies repre-
sented by complete proposition-action strategies are positional strategies.
The converse does not hold in general, which can be shown by providing a CGM containing a po-
sitional strategy differing at two propositionally equivalent states. So to prove the converse we have to
restrict our investigation to CGMs in which enough states are propositionally definable:
Proposition 3. Let sC be a positional C-strategy,and let λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],sC). Suppose that sC(St)⊆
ActC is finite and that every s−1C (αC)⊆ St is propositionally definable. Then there is a proposition-action
strategy RS for C that is complete at λ [0] such that 〈0,λ ,s〉  [C perf]RS.
This shows that, under certain semantic constraints, a given positional strategy is represented by a
complete proposition-action strategy. Thereby we can move strategic reasoning in the semantics about
positional strategies to reasoning on the syntactic level about proposition-action strategies. In conclu-
sion, we show that in a common class of CGMs, complete proposition-action strategies correspond to
positional strategies up to play-equivalence:
Corollary 1. Let s be a perfect recall strategy for C, and let λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],sC). Let St be finite and
let every state be propositionally definable. Then the following are equivalent
1. there is a proposition-action strategy RS for C such that 〈k,λ ,s〉  [C perf]RS∧G∨c∈Cond(RS) c,
2. at λ [0] the perfect recall strategy s is play-equivalent to a positional strategy.
This corollary uncovers that completeness is an underlying condition for positional strategies. Al-
though this discovery is unsurprising and intuitive, it shows that our language is able to express such
underlying intuitions.
5.2 Representing uniform strategies
Here we prove that rule-based strategies are useful for representing uniform strategies, focussing on
individuals’ uniform strategies, using a type of rule-based strategies:
12Compare [17, p. 207]: “a complete strategy provides the player with a “complete guideline” that always provides the player
with one or more suggestions how to act when it is his move”.
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Definition 11. A knowledge-action strategy RS for a coalition C is a rule-based strategy such that the
conditions are of the form Kic with c and the effects e respectively of the form:
c ::= p | c∧ c | ¬c e ::= αC,
where p ranges over Prop and αC ranges over ΣC.
Proposition 4. Let 〈0,λ ,s〉 be a tuple. Define H = {λ ′[0,k′] | λ ′[0] ∼i λ [0]}. Suppose there is a
knowledge-action strategy RS for agent i such that
1. agent i knows that RS is complete at λ [0], i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG∨Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic;
2. agent i knows that she is henceforth able to act according to RS, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG♦[i acc]RS;
3. agent i performs strategy S, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  [i perf]RS.
Then there is a uniform strategy sˆi on H that is play-equivalent to si.
This result is similar to Proposition 2 on positional strategies. Here we see that whenever an agent
performs a knowledge-action strategy of which he knows both that it is complete and that he is hence-
forth able to act accordingly, the agent is performing a strategy that is play-equivalent to a uniform
strategy. This means that, under certain syntactically representable epistemic conditions, a syntactically
characterised knowledge-action strategy corresponds with a uniform strategy in the semantic structures.
The converse does not hold, as can be shown by providing a CEGM containing a uniform strategy that
differs at two distinguishable propositionally equivalent states. But the mismatch runs deeper because
of the restrictions on the conditions of knowledge-action strategies. To obtain a correspondence result in
line with Corollary 1 we believe that the language has to be extended with temporal modalities referring
to the past and the conditions of knowledge-action strategies have to be modified accordingly. To keep
the current exposition accessible we leave this for another occasion. In spite of these simplifications, a
representation result for uniform positional strategies can be proven:
Proposition 5. Let 〈0,λ ,s〉 be a profile. Define H = {λ ′[0,k′] | λ ′[0] ∼i λ [0]}. Suppose si is a uni-
form positional strategy for agent i on H. Suppose that si(St) ⊆ Act is finite and that every s−1i (αi) is
propositionally definable.
Then there is a knowledge-action strategy RS for i such that
1. agent i knows that RS is complete at λ [0], i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG∨Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic;
2. agent i knows that she is henceforth able to act according to RS, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG♦[i acc]RS;
3. 〈0,λ ,s〉  [i perf]RS.
Note that this proposition starts with a uniform positional strategy. This result establishes that, under
certain semantic restrictions, a uniform positional strategy is represented by a knowledge-action strategy
of which one knows both that it is complete and that one can henceforth act accordingly. This shows that
strategic reasoning in the semantics on uniform positional strategies can be diverted to reasoning on the
syntactic level about knowledge-action strategies.
Our representation result reveals crucial underlying conditions for uniform positional strategies,
which are expressible in our language. Indeed, the previous proposition shows that, under certain model
restrictions, performing a uniform positional strategy implies that one is performing a knowledge-action
strategy and one knows both that this knowledge-action strategy is complete and that one is henceforth
able to act accordingly. Revealing such underlying conditions enhances our understanding and triggers
further questions; two of such inquiries are discussed below.
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Does ensuring a property ϕ by performing a uniform strategy entail that knowing that perform-
ing this uniform strategy ensures that property? According to our representation result, this translates
to questioning whether [i sstit]ϕ ∧ [i perf]RS∧KiG∨Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic∧KiG♦[i acc]RS logically entails
Ki([i perf]RS→ [i sstit]ϕ) (where RS is a knowledge-action strategy). It turns out that this indeed fails
since “in order to identify a successful strategy, the agents must consider not only the courses of action,
starting from the current state of the system, but also from states that are indistinguishable from the
current one.” [1, p. 574] Uniform strategies are therefore not faithful to the expectation that “the agent
has enough control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy that enforces [a certain property]
ϕ .” [1, p. 574] An agent has this control and knowledge if and only if there is a knowledge-action strat-
egy RS satisfying KiG
∨
Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic∧KiG♦[i acc]RS∧Ki([i perf]RS→ [i sstit]ϕ). This discussion
highlights the flexibility of our syntactical approach to correct the flaw of uniform strategies.
What is a coalition’s uniform strategy? Formally, it is a tuple of individuals’ uniform strategies;
intuitively, it is intended to capture a coalition’s control and knowledge to identify and execute a strategy
that enforces a certain property ϕ . Does a coalition’s uniform strategy meet this intuition? No, it does not.
In [1, pp. 575-576] it is argued that “there are several different “modes” in which [a coalition] can know
the right strategy”, pointing to a choice between common, mutual, or distributed knowledge of the right
coalitional strategy sC.13 Our results, however, solicit a view, complementing the aforementioned modes,
to adequately conceptualize a coalition’s uniform strategies: First, because a coalition’s uniform strategy
is merely a tuple of individuals’ uniform strategies, a coalition’s uniform strategy sC does not require
that any member can identify the coalitional strategy sC. Indeed, a coalition’s uniform strategy sC merely
requires every member to know their part si of the coalitional strategy sC. So the object of the members’
knowledge differs. Second, since every member knows their part si of a coalition’s uniform strategy sC,
it follows that a coalition’s uniform strategy entails that the coalition has distributed knowledge of the
right coalitional strategy sC, positioning a coalition’s uniform strategy between the modes of mutual and
distributed knowledge of the right coalitional strategy. Third, this knowledge is, however, distributed in
a very particular way, namely by every member knowing their own part si. For instance, whenever i
knows j’s part s j and j knows i’s part si, then they have distributed knowledge of 〈si,s j〉 even though it is
not a uniform strategy. A coalition’s uniform strategy hence does not correspond to any of the “modes”
in [1]. It seems that this distinctive way of distributing knowledge solicits a comparison, not with the
proposed modes in [1] but, with different ways of distributing knowledge of a coalitional strategy sC.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that, under certain model restrictions, a strategy that is play-equivalent to a positional
strategy corresponds to a complete proposition-action strategy. Thereby we have established a firm
correspondence between a semantic strategy type and a syntactic one.
In our research on individuals’ uniform strategies, we have proven that any knowledge-action strategy
of which one knows both that one can henceforth act accordingly and that it is complete represents a
strategy that is play-equivalent to a uniform strategy. Conversely, under certain semantic restrictions,
a uniform positional strategy is represented by a knowledge-action strategy of which one knows both
that one can henceforth act accordingly and that it is complete. This latter result exposes the implicit
13They also mention the option that “the strategy sC can be identified by” (altered notation) a leader, headquarters committee,
or consulting company. Our representation result suggests that the syntactical counterpart of these “modes” is straightforward
by replacing Ki’s with the respective group knowledge in Proposition 5. We will not pursue this suggestion in further detail
here.
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conditions of uniform positional strategies.
The current enterprise is a crucial first step in facilitating strategic reasoning at the syntactic level. By
representing several semantic strategy types and drawing novel conceptual implications we have shown
the fruitfulness of our syntactic approach to enhance our understanding of semantic strategy types.
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A Appendix: Proof sketches of propositions
Proposition 1. Let RS be a rule-based strategy with only moment-determinate conditions. Let sRSC be the
partial coalition strategy defined by RS. Then
1. for any profile 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉 such that sRSC is defined on λ ′[0,k′] we have that the following are equiv-
alent: (a) 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉  [C acc]RS and (b) sRSC (λ ′[0,k′]) = s′C(λ ′[0,k′]).
2. Let 〈k′,λ ′,s′〉 be a profile such that sRSC is defined on all histories in out_plays(λ ′[0,k′],s′C). Then
〈k′,λ ′,s′〉  [C perf]RS if and only if sRSC and s′C are play-equivalent at λ ′[0,k′].
Proof sketch: 1. Follows from the fact that sRSC is defined at a history iff there is exactly one way to act
according to RS at that history. 2. Follows straightforwardly from 1. and property 5(b) in Definition
1.
Proposition 2. Let s be a strategy profile, and let λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],s). Suppose there is a proposition-
action strategy RS for C that is complete at λ [0] such that 〈0,λ ,s〉 [C perf]RS. Then there is a positional
strategy sˆC that is play-equivalent to sC at λ [0].
Proof sketch: It is easy to show that the partial strategy defined by RS is defined on and positional for
histories in out_plays(λ [0],sC). This partial positional strategy can be trivially extended to a positional
strategy, thereby proving the proposition.
Proposition 3. Let sC be a positional C-strategy, and let λ ∈ out_plays(λ [0],sC). Suppose that sC(St)⊆
ActC is finite and that every s−1C (αC)⊆ St is propositionally definable. Then there is a proposition-action
strategy RS for C that is complete at λ [0] such that 〈0,λ ,s〉  [C perf]RS.
Proof sketch: Let {α1C, . . . ,αNC } = sC(St), and let us denote the propositional formula defining s−1C (αnC)
by ξn for each n ≤ N. The proposition-action strategy RS := {ξ1 7→ α1C, . . . ,ξN 7→ αNC } can be used to
prove the proposition.
Proposition 4. Let 〈0,λ ,s〉 be a tuple. Define H = {λ ′[0,k′] | λ ′[0] ∼i λ [0]}. Suppose there is a
knowledge-action strategy RS for agent i such that
1. agent i knows that RS is complete at λ [0], i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG∨Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic;
2. agent i knows that she is henceforth able to act according to RS, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG♦[i acc]RS;
3. agent i performs strategy S, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  [i perf]RS.
Then there is a uniform strategy sˆi on H that is play-equivalent to si.
Proof sketch: The partial strategy defined by RS is defined and uniform on histories in H.
Proposition 5. Let 〈0,λ ,s〉 be a profile. Define H = {λ ′[0,k′] | λ ′[0] ∼i λ [0]}. Suppose si is a uni-
form positional strategy for agent i on H. Suppose that si(St) ⊆ Act is finite and that every s−1i (αi) is
propositionally definable.
Then there is a knowledge-action strategy RS for i such that
1. agent i knows that RS is complete at λ [0], i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG∨Kic∈Cond(RS)Kic;
2. agent i knows that she is henceforth able to act according to RS, i.e. 〈0,λ ,s〉  KiG♦[i acc]RS;
3. 〈0,λ ,s〉  [i perf]RS.
Proof sketch: Analogous to Proposition 3.
